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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL ~\D.AMS and
HILDA M. ~\D:\MS, his \Vife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case' No.
9986

DON A. TAYLOR and
MILDRED B. TAYLOR, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a Judgment of the Second District Court
for Davis County

HONORABLE THORNLEY K. SWAN, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an unlawful detainer action by which respondents seek restitution of premises and treble damages
against appellants and in which appellants counter-claim
for specific performance of a verbal lease and option to
purchase.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court denied respondents any relief, and
granted appellants' prayer for specific performance of the
verbal lease, but denied appellants' prayer for specific
performance of the verbal option to purchase.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's denial of
specific performance of the option to purchase.
ST A TE.MENT OF FACTS
In December, 1958, the appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, approached respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Adams, about
leasing or buying from the Adamses a parcel of ground
fronting on U. S. Highway 91 north of the City of Layton
for an A & W drive-in restaurant (T. 4, 23, 61). There was
on existing building on the parcel in question, but it was
run-down and unsuited for use as a drive-in, having been
condemned by the Davis County Health Department (T.
104, 105). The Taylors took a picture of the premises and
submitted it to the A & W national organization (T. 4, 6, 23,
62), and the national organization approved it, subject to
the making of certain specified changes (T. 6, 7, 62). The
'raylors requested the Adamses to make the necessary improvements to the premises at the Adamses' expense and
recover their money through a higher rent, but the Adamses declined and said the Taylors would have to make
their own improvements (T. 19, 26, 62, 63).
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Between December, 1958, an'd July 1, 1959, there were
a number of meetings between the parties concerning the
terms of a lease and option to buy (T. 7, 64). The parties
agreed to a ten-year lease term with an option to buy and
2greed to a rent figure and other details of the lease and
option (T. 8, 26, 64, 65, 69, 86, 99). Mrs. Adams set the
l'ent figure and accepted a check for one-half of the first
month's rent (T. 19, 23, 26, 62, 64, 75). The Taylors \\·ere
not required to pay any further rent until they moved in
(T. 31). It was agreed that Taylors would have their attorney draw up a lease. embodying those terms (T. 8, 64).
Mrs. Adams told the Taylors that if they put a lot of money
into the place they would have an option to buy. The
'l'aylors had the premises appraised and made an offer for
immediate purchase before any lease, which offer was
rejected (T. 65).
In the month of May, 1959, Mrs. Adams, Mr. Taylor
a.nd a surveyor staked out the boundaries of the subject
premises on the ground, and the surveyor made up a plat
nnd legal description (T. 15, 16, 30, 106-111, defendants'
Exhibit 3). Also in May, the draft of a lease was presented
to the Adamses, but they wanted some changes made and
would not sign a lease with a ten-year term (T. 27, 45, 67).
Attempts to meet at the attorney's office and reconcile
their differences failed because Mr. Adams was sick (T.
13, 14, 18, 73). As the improvements to the property neared
completion and the date for ope.ning the drive-in grew
nearer, the Taylors went to see the Adamses for the purpose of getting something in writing (T. 9, 11, 12, 66, 83).
The date of this visit was July 1, 1959 (T. 67). The Taylors
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told the Adamses they had to have something in writing
before their equipment was put in (T. 66). The parties
then agreed to a four or five-year lease with an option to
purchase for $13,000.00 (T. 34, 38, 65·, 66). Mrs. Adams
wrote on the back of one of the Taylors' checks ( plaintiff's
Exhibit A) the following words:
"Selling price $13,000.00
Four to five Years to buy or lease
Samuel J. Adams
Hilda M Adams''
Mr. Adams was present when Mrs. Adams signed his name
to that check (T. 38).
Under that agreement the Taylors occupied the improved premises and paid rent to the Adamses each month•
for two years (T. 33). Rent checks were often made payable to both Mr. and Mrs. Adams, and Mrs. Adams accepted the checks and endorsed both names to them (T. 32, 33).
After two years, the Adamses' attorney drew a lease with
~;ubstantially different terms than what the parties had
cgreed to, including trebled rent, and the Taylors were
requested to sign it (T. 17, 45). They refused, and the
Adamses attempted to serve them with a document purporting to be a notice to quit (T. 20, 21). The Taylors reInained in the premises, and this lawsuit ensued.
At the time the Taylors entered into the rent and
option agreement with the Adamses, the subject premises
were in a seriously run-down condition. The building had
been vacant for a year or two (T. 104), although Mrs. Ad-
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ams kept some ceramics in it (T. 40). The toilet bowl and
wash basin were broken (T. 104). The sewage disposal was
very inadequate; drainage from the building was running
out on the surface of the ground (T. 77, 104). The sanitarian of the Davis County Health Department had notified
Layton City not to issue a building or occupancy permit
for the structure without a clearance from his department
('r. 104, 105). He had also notified Mr. Adams of the building's shortcomings (T. 104). The building was a health
hazard no matter what use it was put to (T. 105).
Prior to commencing business operations on the premises, the TaYlors made the following improvements:
They took out the old broken toilets and basins and
installed new ones (T.77).
They tore out the floor in the existing building and
the plumbing located in it and installed entirely new
plumbing in the floor, and installed a new floor (T. 78).
They installed new wiring with all new material (T.
78, plaintiffs' Exhibit D [letter of May 22, 1959 from Mr.
Fred Bradshaw] ) .
They installed a new water system (T. 78).
They installed a new septic tank and drain field (T.
78).
They ran a natural gas line from nearby Angel Street,
\Vhich is not the street on which the premises are located,
to the premises (T. 78).
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They constructed a 13'6" x 20' addition on the back of
the existing structure ( T. 79, 97).
They installed a new roof on the old structure, removing some of the old studding and sheathing and installing new studding and sheathing (T. 79, 87).
They blacktopped the surrounding area (T. 83).
They installed light poles and lights for outside
lighting (T. 83).
And they installed an A & W neon sign (T. 83).
The value of the improvements to the building and
premises by the Taylors was approximately $10,500.00 (T.
84, 95). All of the material and labor which that figure
represents went into the building (T. 88, 94, 95).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THAT PART OF THE PAR'1'IES' VERBAL AGREEMENT WHICH PERTAINED
TO A LEASE.
Although the agreement between the parties for a
lease and option to purchase the premises in question was
verbal only, and therefore subject to the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated
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1953, it was nevertheless enforcable by reason of the companion section, 25-5-8, U.C.A. 1953, which states. "Nothing
:n this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the
powers of courts to compel the specific performance of
agreements in case of part performance thereof." The latter section apparently only restates the. well recognized
equitable principal that courts will not allow the Statute
of Frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud by allowing one party to escape performance of his obligations
under an oral agreement after permitting the other to
perform in reliance upon the agreement. As the author
at 49 Am.Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section 422, at Page 727
has stated:

The. doctrine of part performance operates not upon
the theory that the part performance is a substitute
for the written evidence required by the statute of
frauds, but on the theory that the defendant may
be estopped in view of the part performance to assert the statute as a defense. Part performance takes
the case out of the statute not because it furnishes
proof of the contract, or because it makes the contract any stronger, but because it would be intolerable in equity for the owner of a tract of land
knowingly to suffer another to invest time, labor,
and money in that land, upon the- faith of a contract
which did not exist.
The court's attention is directed to the unquestioned
part performance which is present in this case. Beginning
in July, 1959, the appellants (TaYlors) had possession of
the premises in dispute here, and every month for twentySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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four months they operated an A & W drive-in restaurant
thereon. Every month for twenty-four months they paid
rent to respo1;1dents (Adamses), and in each of these twenty-four months, respondents accepted the checks. The
checks were endorsed by Mrs. Adams and were paid in
the normal course of business. It is submitted that this is
a very substantial part performance of the lease aspect of
the parties' agreement.
But perhaps more important are the extensive improvements to the premises which appellants installed
after the original agreement as to lease terms. The detailed
items are set forth in the Statement of Facts herein at
pages 2 through 5 and will not be repeated at this point.
The only reliable testimony of their total cost was given
by appellant Mr. Taylor at $10,500.00. Respondents attempted, through the testimony of a retired contractor
vrho had not been licensed for eight years, to rebut this
testimony, but on cross-examination that witness, Mr.
1,ord, testified he did not take into consideration the majoritY of the improvements which appellants had made
(T. 122, 125). The trial court found that the improvements
made by appellants were substantial in nature and were
oi a value in excess of $6,000.00 (R. 61, Finding No.9 ).
In 1940, this court decided a case, Latses v. Nick
Ji,loor, Inc., 99 U. 214, 104 P.2d 619, which turned on the
doctrine of valuable or substantial improvement. The
language of that decision at 104 P.2d 622 is directly pertinent here:
This court has recognized the principle that improvements placed upon premises may take the
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contract out of the statute of frauds even to the
extent of requiring a conveYance of the property
upon an oral agreement. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86.
86 P. 767, 8. L.R.A., N.S., 870; Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 1481. Certainly if a conveyance may be had upon an oral
agreement so taken out of the statute, an extension
of the term of a lease should be granted upon the
same grounds. Leases have been extended before
upon such grounds. 33 A.L.R. 1489, 1510; Read
Drug & Chemical Co. v. Nattans, 129 Md. 67. 98 A.
158. The Utah cases cited above bring out the fact
that the improvements must be such as are indicative of something more than repairs that a tenant
from month to month might make simply for his
own convenience. Under the lease in question, they
were to be permanent improvements.
To the same effect is the text at 49 Am.Jur., Statute of
Frauds, Section 449, Page 755:
The making of valuable permanent improvements
on the land by the purchaser, in pursuance of the
agreement and with the knowledge of the vendor,
has been said to be the strongest and most unequivocal act of part performance by which a verbal
contract to sell land is taken out of the statute of
frauds, and is ordinarily an improvement element
in such part performance. It appears that even in
a comparatively early period of the statute of frauds
there was coined the apt expression that "a man
may be improved out of his estate." The rule has
been laid down in numerous cases that the making
bY the purchaser of valuable and permanent improvements upon land purchased by parol agreement, in reliance upon the agreement, may constitute a sufficient part performance to take the
contract out of the operation of the statute. The
view is that where the purchaser upon the faith of
the contract makes valuable improvements upon
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the land for which he has not been compensated
from the' produce and profits of the land, and for
\Vhich he cannot be adequately compensated in
damages, a palpable fraud would be perpetrated
upon him if the vendor were permitted to repudiate the contract .
.ft.nd further in the same section, at Page 7 56:
Possession by the purchaser under parol contract
for the purchase of real property, together with his
making valuable and permanent improvements on
the property which are referable exclusively to the
contract, in reliance on the contract, in the honest
belief that he has a right to make them, and with
the knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the
the knowledge and consent or acquiescense of the
vendor, is deemed a part performance of the
contract.
The author of the foregoing text cites a Utah case, Hogan
v. Swayze, 65 U. 380, 237 P. 1097 (1925).
Also supporting the above-stated rule is 1 American
Law of Property, Section 3.21, at Page 219, with respect to
the landlord-tenant relationship, and Sections 11.7 and 11.9
vvith respect to the vendor-purchaser relationship. At Section 11.9 of the last cited text, the author states:
Where a purchaser takes possession, under an oral
agreement for the sale of land or of an interest
therein, with the consent of the vendor, and, once
in possession, makes valuable and lasting improvements on the premises in reliance on the contract
it has been generally held that there is sufficient'
part performance to take the case out of the Statute
of Frauds. The improvements must be such that
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they are referable solely to a contract, and that
they have been made in reliance upon the promise
to convey. Thus made, they are usually strong evidence of the existence of a contract and of irreparable injury if the contract is not enforced.
All of the authors cited thus far have required that
the improvements relied upon must be referable to the
<.;ontract, i.e., must have been made in reliance on or in
performance of the oral contract. To the same effect is
Corbin on Contracts, Volume 2, Section 434, at Page 495,
where the author saYs:
As in the case of possession, the improvements made
will have small weight unless they are of a kind
that would not have been made had there been no
oral contract. They must be "referable to the contract," it is often said. This does not mean that the
improvements made must have been referred to in
any way in the contract but only that they are such
as it would have been improvident to make in the
absence of some such contract, so that they are
strong circumstantial evidence of its existence .
•

This court has so held in Randall v Tracy Collins Trust
L'ompany, 6 U.2d 18, 305, P.2d 480 (1956), and In re Madsen's Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DEWIED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THAT PART OF THE PARTIES' VERBAL AGREEMENT WHICH PERTAINED
TO AN OPTION TO PURCHASE.
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The appellants and respondents did not ~nter into two
contracts. A single consideration - namely, appellants'
covenant to pay rent - supported both the respondents'
covenant to give possession of the premises for five years
under the lease and to sell at the end of the lease period
for $13,000.00. See Corbin, Volume lA, Section 266, at
Page 539. The appellants would not have entered into the
one without the other (T. 86).
Counsel ackn(nvledges that the authorities cited under
Point I herein refer both to leases and contracts to sell. It
is the identity of con/trolling principles in each case which
illustrates the point here discussed. The option to purchase
is a contract for the sale of realty. It is inseparably joined
with the agreement to lease the premises. This seems clear
from the fact that this was commercial propertY, that it
\vas in a run-down condition when the appellants took it
over, that it required substantial improvements of a permanenrt nature in order to make it usable, and that the appellants in fact made the necessary improvements at considerable expense to themselves. Such improvements are
not reasonably referable solely to a five-year lease, since
it would require the sizeable portion of that lease term in
order to build up a busines, and without an option to
purchase or an option to renew, the business would be
lost within a relatively short time. It is not reasonable to
suppose that it would have been worth the trouble for
appellants to install those permanent improvements or to
suppose that they could recover their investment in that
short a time.
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The whole history of the parties' negotiations \vith
reference to their agreement bears out the fact that it was
one agreement intended to accomplish one purpose. More
particularly, from an examination of plaintiffs' Exhibit A,
the check signed on July 1, 1959, at the home of the respondents, there can be no doubt that the respondents
agreed to a five-year lease with an option to purchase the
vremises at the end of the five-year lease for the sum of
$13,000.00. It is submitted that a findin'g by the trial court
that the one existed is necessarily a finding that the other
existed, and the finding that both agreements existed is
the only one supportable by the evidence.

* * *
Inasmuch as respondents have cross-appealed, it is
deemed appropriate at this point to make reference to
three arguments which have been advanced in the trial
court.
First, respondents have argued that because the docuInent. plaintiffs' Exhibit A, signed by Mrs. Adams, makes
reference to a four or five-Year term, the lease is therefore
indefinite and cannot be sustained even in the light of
extensive part performance. The only authority counsel
has been able to find is to the contrary. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 62, at Page 78, states. "A lease
may be in the alternative for two or more specified periods
at the option of the lessee without being invalid for want
of certainty as to the duration of the term; and where it
is in the alternative for two or more specified periods,
without stating by whom the period is to be determined,
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it has been held that the option to determine for which

period the lease shall continue was given to the lessee,
and therefore the lease was not invalid for want of certainty as to the term, the reason for this being that the lease
should be con1strued most favorably to the lessee." The
text at that point cites Dann v. Spurrier, 3 Bos & P 399,
127 Eng Reprint 218, 2 Eng Rul Cas 756, 15 Eng Rul Cas
4b8, which case cites Goodright d. Hall v. Richardson,
3 T.R. 462 (1789). The Goodright case is cited in 2 Walsh,
Com1nentaries, Law· of Real Property (1947) Section 140
at Page 115 in support of the same rule above cited from
American Jurisprudence.
Second, respondents have argued that the parties were
not to be bound by any agreement until a writing had been
executed by them. With reference to this point, Corbin,
Volume 1, Section 30, Page 98 says with reference to contracting parties: "If their expressions convince the court
that they intended to be bound without a formal document,
their contract is consummated and the expected formal documenrt will be nothing more than a memorial of that
contract. In very manY cases the court has been convinced
that such was the intention and has held the parties bound
by a contract, even though no document has been executed." In the same sectioni at Page 105, the author states:
''Usage and custom may be decisive of the issue. The
greater the complexity and importance of the transaction,
the more likely it is that the informal communications
u.re intended to be preliminary only. The fact that the
parties contemplate the execution of a document is some
evidence not in itself conclusive that they intend not to
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be bound until it is executed ... The subseque11t conduct
and interpretation of the parties themselves may be decisive on tht' question as to whether a contract has been
roadc, even though a document was contemplated and has
never been executed. They may both have already begun
performance and may have made statements that are
strongly evidential. Of course, the subsequent conduct of
the parties may constitute a tacit contract on the terms
previously agreed upon, even though the understanding
had at first been that the execution of a formal document
was necessarY." It is pointed out that the conduct of the
parties as disclosed by the testimony in the record is that
they did intend to be bound, even though the understanding had at first been that a formal lease and option agreement would be drawn.
Thirdly, respondents have contended that Mrs. Adams
was without authority to enter into the negotiations with
appellants on behalf of Mr. Adams or to sign anything in
his behalf. In his testimony Mr. Adams said that Mrs.
Adams did most of the negotiations, and that she did so
'vith authority from him (T.49). The prior course of dealing by Mrs. Adams with others in relation to their property strongly suggests that she had authority in this
transaction. It was Mrs. Adams who carried on the conversations with appellants, and it was she who took the draft
agreement to the local banker for his opinion on it. It was
she who showed Mr. Fifield where the boundary pegs
should go. It was she who signed the back of the check,
plaintiffs' Exhibit A, in the presence of Mr. Adams without
his protest, and it was she who leased the property previously to Mr. Bench.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the evidence is clear and convincing that
appellants: and respondents entered into a verbal lease and
option to purchase agreement which was certain in its
terms, which was entered into by both parties and partly
performed, and which should now be enforced by a court
of equity. Accordingly, the holding of the trial court granting specific performance of the parties' agreement as to
lease of the premises in question should be affirmed, and
the holding denying specific performance of appellants'
option to purchase said premises should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BEAN AND BEAN
K. Roger Bean
50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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